

Lexical Architectures of Identity in Indonesia's 2024 Presidential Debate (Round Three): Mapping of Religion, Parties, and Civics

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Abstract. This study examines how identity is performed and deliberation sustained in public reactions to Indonesia's 2024 presidential debate (Round Three) on YouTube. Grounded in Social Identity Theory (SIT), the study analyzes comments from two official streams, TVRI and KPU, using a transparent, event-anchored text-mining pipeline in Voyant: word frequency profiling, collocation mapping, topic segmentation with dictionary scoring, and KWIC-based frame diagnostics. The current research operationalizes deliberative emphasis via a topic-conditioned civics-morality ratio contrasting civic-institutional vocabulary (e.g., *konstitusi*, *DPR*, *KPU*, *prosedur*) with moral-absolutist tokens (e.g., *halal/haram*, *kafir*, *dosa*, *benar/salah*). Results are consistent across tools. Collocation networks are leader-centric and role/ticket-forward, with weak coupling between religious labels and candidate names. Topic panels diverge by venue: TVRI concentrates virtue predicates and salutations with only episodic institutional references, yielding a low civics-morality ratio; KPU is saturated with institutional and process terms, producing a high ratio. KWIC corroborates this split. TVRI windows around candidate tokens are dominated by acclamation/attack and scoreboard talk, while KPU windows embed address forms within rule-following, evidence, and programmatic language (e.g., *aturan*, *bukti*, *data*, *program*, *prinsip*). The study concludes that, during this debate, identity talk on YouTube was personalized rather than confessional or party-fused, and deliberative emphasis was contingent on institutional framing: the electoral authority's channel scaffolded procedural reasoning, whereas the broadcaster's thread incentivized expressive partisanship. The civics-morality ratio, conditioned by topics and triangulated with KWIC and collocation, offers an interpretable, reproducible indicator for assessing event-time discourse quality in platformed political talk.

Keywords: Social Identity Theory; identity politics; Indonesia 2024 election; YouTube comments; religion.

1. Introduction

Background

Indonesia's third presidential debate (Istora Senayan, 7 January 2024) concentrated national attention on defense, security, geopolitics, and foreign policy. However, its reception unfolded in a digital sphere densely saturated with identity cues. With internet penetration approaching four-fifths of the population and YouTube among the most frequented venues for political talk, debate videos rapidly attracted high-velocity comment streams that blended evaluation, mobilization, and moralization (Asosiasi

Penyelenggaraan Jasa Internet Indonesia, 2024; Kemp, 2024). Democratic theory presumes civics-anchored deliberation, reason-giving oriented to rules, evidence, and institutions, where lexical markers such as konstitusi, DPR, KPU, and prosedur signal procedural engagement.

Empirically, however, Indonesian elections since 2014 reveal persistent activation of religious and partisan identities, with Islamic organizational networks and narratives (e.g., those associated with Nahdlatul Ulama) structuring alignment and cueing voter heuristics well into the 2024 cycle (Widian et al., 2022; Hasyim, 2024). Turnout in February 2024 exceeded 80%, underscoring that online discourse was contiguous with mass participation rather than peripheral noise (CNN Indonesia, 2024). The resulting tension between deliberative ideals and identity-inflected practice is precisely where a lexical audit of debate-adjacent YouTube comments can illuminate how religion, parties, and civics are articulated in real time (Boukes, 2024; Macanovic, 2022).

Related Literature

Comparative work shows that social-media architectures preferentially amplify moralized language, accelerating affective polarization and antagonistic framing (Bavel et al., 2021; Solovev and Pröllochs, 2022). In Indonesia, studies document how religious and ethnic signals travel through campaign scripts and public commentary, including YouTube, often correlating with polarized identity talk and selective exposure (Herdiansah and Sumadinata, 2019; Syam and Afdal, 2024; Romadoni, 2024). At the same time, the measurement frontier has advanced: communication research specifies conditions under which online talk approximates deliberation and offers scalable text-analytic diagnostics of interactivity, rationality, and civility (Boukes, 2024); corpus linguistics refines collocation and concordance methods for mapping identity constructions in political discourse (Brookes and McEnery, 2020); and computational social science supplies portable indicators for polarization and discursive alignment (Muñoz et al., 2024). Method platforms such as Voyant Tools enable transparent, replicable workflows around frequency, collocation, and topic exploration suitable for single-event corpora and scholarly audit (Sinclair and Rockwell, 2025; TESL-EJ, 2020; Angdresey et al., 2025).

Two additional strands matter for operationalization. First, political-rhetoric studies caution that “morality” dictionaries can be ambiguous unless tuned to corpus context, urging domain-sensitive metrics rather than generic sentiment scores (Kraft and Klemmensen, 2023; Neumann and Rhodes, 2023). Second, debate-focused analyses show that YouTube comment spaces are fertile sites for affective partisanship and frame contests, yet require micro-context inspection (e.g., KWIC) to distinguish procedural reasoning from delegitimation (Eaton, 2024; Hobbs and O’Keefe, 2024).

Rationale, State of the Art, Gap, and Novelty

Despite rich accounts of Indonesian identity politics and an expanding toolkit for measuring online discourse, three empirical gaps persist for the 2024 electoral cycle.

First, few studies quantify lexical architectures that link religion, party, and candidate names within a single high-salience debate corpus; extant work remains largely qualitative or platform-wide rather than event-anchored (Ibrahim et al., 2024; Danugroho, 2024). Second, the relative weight of civics-institutional vocabulary versus moral-absolutist tokens across debate-adjacent comment topics is rarely benchmarked with interpretable ratios, leaving the deliberative quality of discourse underspecified (Supratikno, 2022; Simonsen and Widmann, 2023). Third, few KWIC-level frame diagnostics can discriminate between procedural reasoning (rules, evidence, institutions) and confrontational rhetoric (accusation or delegitimation) in Indonesian YouTube threads.

This study addresses these gaps by integrating Social Identity Theory (SIT), which posits that commenters' self-categorization into religious, partisan, or civic groupings shapes evaluation and language use, with a compact, reproducible text-mining design. Concretely, the work deploys a triangulated diagnostic on the Round-Three debate comment corpus using Voyant Tools, by (a) proximity-based collocation networks to estimate identity alignment among religion, party, and candidate tokens; (b) a topic-conditioned civics/morality ratio to index deliberative emphasis; and (c) KWIC frame classification to surface argumentative styles. Voyant Tools is a web-based reading and analysis environment for digital texts, such as comments (Irmayanti and Muktadir, 2025), that helps to map the RQs (religion, parties, and civics). The novelty lies in unifying these three measurements on a single-event Indonesian dataset to produce interpretable visual triads and indices that simultaneously speak to SIT (group-cue alignment) and democratic theory (civics-forward versus moralized discourse), while honoring domain cautions about dictionary ambiguity through topic conditioning and micro-context checks (Neumann and Rhodes, 2023; Macanovic, 2022).

Research Questions and Objectives

Guided by SIT and optimized for transparent, rapid analysis on a single-event YouTube corpus. The current investigation investigates Indonesia's 2024 Presidential Debate, Round Three, through three tractable questions:

RQ1. Identity alignment via collocation. How strongly are religion, party, and candidate tokens coupled in collocation space within YouTube comments to the Round-Three debate? Objective: compute proximity scores and visualize religion-party-candidate triads to estimate alignment strength (Macanovic, 2022).

RQ2. Deliberative emphasis via civics-morality ratio. Across emergent topics, what is the share of civic-institutional vocabulary (e.g., konstitusi, DPR, KPU, prosedur) relative to moral-absolutist tokens (e.g., halal/haram, kafir, dosa; benar/salah)? Objective: calculate topic-conditioned civics/morality ratios as a concise, interpretable index of deliberative emphasis (Neumann and Rhodes, 2023; Abdelrazek et al., 2023).

RQ3. Frame diagnostics with KWIC. Do KWIC windows around civics versus religious tokens exhibit procedural reasoning (rules/evidence/institutions) or confrontational rhetoric (accusation/delegitimation)? Objective: extract KWIC spans and apply light

rule-based labels to compare procedural versus confrontational frames across topics (Eaton, 2024; Hobbs and O’Keefe, 2024).

Therefore, this study maps how identity talk structures public reasoning during Indonesia’s 2024 presidential debate (Round Three) by mining YouTube comments through the lens of Social Identity Theory. First, it quantifies identity alignment by estimating the proximity of religion-, party-, and candidate-named tokens in collocation space, then visualizes the resulting triads to reveal which religious markers cluster with partisan and candidate labels and how tightly those links form. Second, it gauges deliberative emphasis across emergent topics by contrasting dictionary counts of civic-institutional vocabulary (e.g., *konstitusi*, *DPR*, *KPU*, *prosedur*) with moral-absolutist terms (e.g., *halal/haram*, *kafir*, *dosa*, *benar/salah*), yielding an interpretable civics/morality ratio that signals whether discourse leans toward procedural reasoning or moralized assertion. Third, it conducts frame diagnostics via KWIC windows around civics and religious tokens, applying light rule-based labels to distinguish procedural frames (rules, evidence, institutions) from confrontational rhetoric (accusation, delegitimation).

Contribution

Substantively, the paper clarifies whether identity talk “travels” into a policy-oriented debate arena and how far actual discourse departs from civics-anchored deliberation. Methodologically, it offers a transparent, replicable workflow, frequency, collocation, topic segmentation, and KWIC inspection, readily auditable by reviewers and extensible to other events. Empirically, it provides event-specific, Indonesia-grounded evidence that complements broader platform studies by aligning lexical signals with documented religious brokerage and partisan dynamics in the 2014, 2019, and 2024 sequence (Widian et al., 2022; Hasyim, 2024; Romadoni, 2024). In doing so, it advances a compact state of the art template for measuring the lexical architectures of identity in digital democracies.




Figure 1. The Study Framework

2. Method

Sampling frame

The current paper analyzes public comments posted beneath two official uploads of Indonesia’s 2024 presidential Round-Three debate (Istora Senayan, 7 January 2024), from TVRI Nasional (videoId=ZnQuXzN5XIs) and KPU RI (videoId=KJdt-HBBGIo). Comments that are from both of channel supporting to investigate the RQs. Channels were chosen ex-ante for (i) institutional authority (state broadcaster, and election commission), (ii) event specificity (the same debate round), and (iii) comment velocity sufficient for single-event corpus diagnostics. Additionally, the comments retained Indonesian and English comments with ≥ 3 alphabetic tokens, discarded non-text (emoji-only), spam patterns, and external-link dumps. Prior debate-comment studies justify the platform/event focus and selection heuristics (Eaton, 2024).

Comments are harvested via the YouTube Data API v3 using `commentThreads.list` (top-level) and `comments.list` (replies), paginated to exhaustion and time-stamped (fields: `commentId`, `parentId`, author channel ID, `timestamp`, like count, `text`) (Google for Developers, 2025b; Google for Developers, 2025a). Moreover, the study removed exact/self-reposts, stripped tracking artefacts, and collapsed quote-retweets.

Tabel 1. The Source of Commentary

No	YouTube Channel	Title	Link
1	TVRI Nasional 759K subscribers (5881 comments)	Siaran Nasional Debat Ketiga Calon Presiden PEMILU 2024, 7 Januari 2024 (1,5M views)	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZnQuXzN5XIs
2	KPU RI 381K subscribers (5175 comments)	Debat Ketiga Calon Presiden Pemilu Tahun 2024 (3,4M views)	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KJdt-HBBGIo

Pre-processing

Pre-processing implemented using RStudio for normalization, language handling, tokenization, and the bot/coordination screen. Normalization is via Unicode NFC, lowercase, punctuation/symbol stripping (except intra-word hyphens), URL/user-handle masking, and whitespace normalization. Language handling is via FastText language IDs: Indonesian comments are routed to an Indonesian stoplist, English comments to an English stoplist, and code-mixed lines are retained. Tokenization or lemmatization is performed using Indonesian-aware tokenization, heuristic lemmatization for common inflections, and bigram detection to preserve fixed political names (e.g., party labels) as single tokens. Bot or coordination screen is via optional heuristics (burstiness, near-duplicate sequences); flagged but did not remove comments; sensitivity checks reported. These steps follow corpus-linguistic best practice for political discourse analysis (Taylor, 2022).

Tabel 2. Data and Fething (RStudio): Targets (Comments-Level Quotas)

Target MOE ($\pm e$)	Total n	TVRI ($\approx 53.2\%$)	KPU ($\approx 46.8\%$)
2%	1,973	1,050	923
3%	974	519	455
5%	372	198	174
7%	193	103	90
10%	96	52	44

Note. Stratified random sample (by channel) using the standard proportion margin-of-error formula with finite-population correction. TVRI Nasional (N_1) = 5,881 comments, KPU RI (N_2) = 5,175 comments, total (N) = 11,056. For a 95% confidence level ($z = 1.96$) and worst-case variance ($p = 0.5$).

Primary target for this study: $n \approx 1,000$ ($\pm 3\%$ MOE), allocated TVRI 519 + KPU 455. Rationale: RQ1 (collocation networks) stabilizes nicely around $\sim 1k$ comments for frequent tokens; enough edges to visualize religion, party, candidate triads. RQ2 (topic-conditioned civics/morality ratios) needs adequate mass per topic, $\sim 1k$ total typically yields ≥ 50 –100 comments in several topics, making the ratio interpretable. RQ3 (KWIC

frame rules) gets you hundreds of KWIC windows around civics/religion tokens, sample to tag procedural vs. confrontational frames. Voyant Tools investigates all the reasons to fulfill research needs (Irmayanti et al., 2024).

Tabel 3. Fetched Comments (RStudio)

Channel (ID)	Total shown	Fetched
TVRI Nasional (1)	5,881	5,200
KPU RI (2)	5,175	4,333

The analyses are run inside Voyant (Sinclair and Rockwell, 2025). Therefore, the study uploads a UTF-8 corpus, while outside, the work mirrors the same pipeline to keep counts consistent with Voyant’s tokenization options. Voyant’s stoplist and context-window parameters are recorded in the project log. Exploratory frequency, collocation, KWIC, and topics are executed in Voyant Tools for parameterized runs and exportable TXT outputs (contexts, collocates, topics). This step enables transparent replication without bespoke code, consistent with best practice.

Social identity theory (SIT): Guide narration and interpretation plan

This research examines results through SIT, salient religious and partisan identities in a high-stakes event should increase proximity coupling of religion, party, and candidate tokens (RQ1), shift topic mixes toward moral, absolutist vocabulary (lower DER; RQ2), and elevate confrontational framing in KWIC (RQ3). SIT predicts stronger in-group signaling when out-group references are salient. The research, therefore track triads that bind specific religious cues to parties/candidates as evidence of alignment (Bliuc et al., 2021; Bonomi et al., 2021).




Figure 2. The Study Procedure

3. Results and Discussion

A. Result

Identity alignment

TVRI figure (collocates around prabowo, pak, debat). 1) The graph is candidate-centric: prabowo is the largest node, tightly linked to the honorific pak and to the debate frame debat, with lighter ties to anis/anies and ganjar. 2) Honorific alignment dominates: the strongest edge binds pak ↔ prabowo, signalling deferential address and personalization rather than institutional or doctrinal anchoring. 3) Religious lexicon is absent in the immediate collocation field, filler tokens (ya, nya) appear at the periphery. This absence implies weak religion-candidate coupling in comments keyed to the TVRI stream. 4) Triads that would express religion-party-candidate identity do not materialize; instead, the visible triad is pak-prabowo-debat, i.e., respect + person + event. Overall, on TVRI's thread, identity talk crystallizes around the person of the candidate and the ritualized event ("debate"), not around religious or party labels, evidence of low cross-domain alignment (religion ↔ candidate) and high personalization.

KPU figure (collocates around prabowo, anis, pak). 1) The center of gravity again rests on candidate names: prabowo is the dominant hub, with thick reciprocal ties to pak and a salient bridge to anis. 2) Coalitional cues surface via gibran, collocating with prabowo; this encodes the ticket identity and yields a candidate-coalition dyad (prabowo-gibran) more than a party label per se. 3) Cross-candidate referencing (anis, ganjar) co-occurs within the same window, indicating comparative talk rather than sectarian sorting. Tokens like jadi and a truncated presen (likely "presiden/presensi") lean toward role/status framing. 4) As with TVRI, religious markers do not enter the collocation core, leaving religion-candidate triads unformed; the robust triad here is pak-prabowo-gibran (honorific + candidate + running mate). With these findings on the KPU channel, alignment strengthens around ticket identity and respectful address, with minimal religious coupling, commenters organize meaning through elite labels and roles, not through doctrinal tags.

Across both streams, collocation space is dominated by personalization (honorific "pak") and candidate/ticket labels (Prabowo, Anis/Anies, Gibran), while religious vocabulary is effectively absent from the high-weight edges. As a result, the religion-party-candidate triads that would indicate fused identity blocs are weak or missing. The strongest alignments are: 1) pak ↔ prabowo (deferential personalization), 2) prabowo ↔ gibran (ticket identity, KPU figure), and 3) candidate ↔ debat (event framing, TVRI figure). These patterns indicate that, in the Round Three debate comments analyzed, identity alignment operates primarily through leader-centric and ticket cues, not through religion or formal party markers.




Figure 3. The Collocation Graph (A for TVRI's result and B for KPU's result)

Deliberative Emphasis

TVRI (topic panel). The top themes cluster around leader virtue and ticket talk with scattered procedural cues. Topics feature moral or affective predicates, e.g., appeals to jujur/tegas, admonitions (“jangan pakai agama”), salutations (assalamualaikum), and righteousness framing, alongside candidate and ticket references. Civic-institutional terms appear, but thinly, by isolated mentions of DPR, MK, anggaran, and program surface inside longer candidate-centric strings. Topic-conditioned dictionary counts therefore tilt toward morality tokens over institutional vocabulary, yielding a low civics-morality ratio. In short, TVRI's topic space reads as persona-moral narration with only episodic anchoring in rules, procedures, or bodies.

KPU (topic panel). The KPU topics foreground institutional process and event governance. High-weight strings repeatedly invoke KPU, pemilu, negara/rakyat, presen/presiden, and participation frames (panel prompts, session flow, oversight). Religious or absolutist markers (e.g., Allah, virtue claims) do appear, but they live at the margins of topics that are otherwise saturated with procedural and organizational lexicon. On a topic-by-topic basis, dictionary tallies place civic-institutional terms above moral predicates, producing a high civics-morality ratio. The discourse here is rules-attentive and process-tracking, not merely virtue-signalling.

Across topic segments, TVRI commenters articulate debate meaning chiefly through virtue and identity descriptors with intermittent institutional references, low deliberative emphasis. KPU commenters narrate the debate via institutions, procedures, and roles, high deliberative emphasis. Framed through SIT, both arenas mobilize identity, yet the lexical architecture differs. TVRI performs identity through moral evaluation of leaders, whereas KPU performs identity through civic procedure and institutional participation.

Topics

- 1 paslon km gibran ganjar by jg bapak salah butuh
- tanis contoh ex yakin assalamualaikum biaya ne ibadah cendana maju
- jadi jawaban maaf bang latn korupsi swastiastu tsb mentolak menterima
- penpimpin mu sang suara betul ga udah hilirisasi menang 3
- ms debat aja dpr muka gua om pembukaan salam menjadi
- salah menjabat any mas beli nama pentonton agamanya jga no
- ya presen hadir 01 2024 publik anggaran ngomong minta mohon
- pak indonesia sembako semoga mk ketahuan tertutup berani dengar berteriak
- prabowo pertanggung jawab tetap omon data program menserang tau negara
- nya lakukan coba 2 ibu ngk slm fc obat the

Documents

tvri_clean_concat_cleaner



Topics

- ms tuh de7zx su menjadi tanis info hati 199 anies
- 98 berhasil kendaraan luar ya kembali ikut pokok besar rasa
- indonesia hup abis biar pelestina bijaksana jokowi allah thn tetap
- kau pemilu negara aja rakyat kasian ganjar penpimpin menang demo
- presen kpu jv tahun orang menpimpin tanato yulyon raya haha
- ll semoga utk suara ri gak warga any sejarah pilih
- unek ngomong kebenaran awali bnyak kak sejarah literasi akal nurani
- jadi ill tahu kasih pa pagi jendral kecurangan takut mantap
- prabowo penculikan baca baik korban kalah ekonomi cari beda ingt
- l pak nya alhamdulillah apk kemenangan bangsa terima mt 28

Documents

kpu_clean_concat_cleaner



Figure 4. The Topics (above for TVRI's result and below for KPU's result)

Frame diagnostics

The research inspected KWIC windows from Voyant around the high-salience tokens shown in each panel and labeled frames with light rules, 1) Procedural reasoning by co-occurrence of rule/authority/evidence verbs or nouns (e.g., aturan, bukti, data, program, prinsip, fasilitas umum, mengikuti/menaati, komisi, proses). 2) Confrontational rhetoric by affective acclaim/attack, delegitimation, or virtue signaling (e.g., terbaik, paling, cinta, menang, goblok, hina, curang, emojis/laughter).

TVRI: KWIC around Prabowo. The left/right windows are saturated with acclamatory and taunt registers, cheering formulas (“yang dukung dari 10 thn,” “bangga,” “paling,” “menang,” emoji clusters), evaluatives of persona (“cerdas,” “tegas,” “berkelas,”), and opponent jibes or scoreboard talk (“skor,” “rank,” “paling,” “gas,” “nyesel,” laughter markers). Institutional or evidentiary terms are largely absent in the immediate contexts; verbs of reasoning or compliance rarely appear. These cues fit the confrontational/partisan frame, where identity is performed by praise, ridicule, and competitive boasting, not by references to rules, procedures, or data. Label: *Dominant style = Confrontational acclaim/attack; Procedural traces = minimal.*

KPU: KWIC around pak. The KWIC lines mix address forms with explicit procedural and ethical vocabulary by “nggak benar aturan,” “ikut aturan,” “prinsip kenegaraan,” “program hebat,” “data program,” “bukti,” “fasilitas umum,” “jangan sampai,” “jejak,” and governance nouns (“presen/presiden,” “negara/rakyat,” oversight language). Religious salutes (“alhamdulillah,” “salam agama”) do appear, but they are embedded next to rule-talk and evidence cues. Several windows narrate accountability or compliance (e.g., whether facilities may be used, proof of claims, following established principles). Label: *Dominant style = Procedural reasoning with ethical-civic checks, while confrontational notes = present but secondary.*

TVRI comments frame argumentation as identity performance, celebration and derision rather than rule-bound justification. Meanwhile, KPU comments more often articulate procedural reasoning, invoking aturan, bukti, program, and prinsip to evaluate conduct and policies, while still allowing moral/religious coloration at the margins. The interpretation of SIT for both arenas mobilize in-group identity, yet their argumentative styles diverge lexically. TVRI performs solidarity through affect and confrontation, while, KPU performs it through institutional language and evidentiary checks. This supports RQ3 that mentioned KWIC diagnostics reveal that procedural frames concentrate on the KPU thread, whereas confrontational frames dominate the TVRI thread.

Document	Left	Term	Right
tvri_cle...	saya yang kudukng ganjar 10	pr...	gibran be the best ❤️❤️ 11
tvri_cle...	buat rakyat ..semoga kedepa pak	pr...	&mas gibran..bisa jadi penpin
tvri_cle...	dimana keputusan rakyat memilih pak	pr...	, dion menang dengan angka yang
tvri_cle...	ms] semoga allohmengangkat derajat bapak	pr...	aminn 27 bapak any cerdas
tvri_cle...	heppy 🐼 (z) 31 [] sebener sy	pr...	addict dari awal cmn untuk
tvri_cle...	selebihnya saya yakin dgn pak	pr...	seandainya antara anis / ganjar menjadi
tvri_cle...	wixisucen e ixsu7cen8ceb8 cenx8shc8shc8sjc7sjuuhgdd 36 [] 🙌🙌🙌	pr...	gibran 🙌🙌🙌 37 [az] ganjar hadir
tvri_cle...	az] ganjar hadir 38 [] pak	pr...	pasti menang 39 [] prabowo paling
tvri_cle...	pak prabowo pasti menang 39 []	pr...	paling cocok jdi persen 40
tvri_cle...	bnjak tau.wkwk 50 tetap pk	pr...	terbaik 51@haurachannel5453kocak nya netizen
tvri_cle...	udh menjabat ? 53 [] saya mendukung	pr...	sebagai capres selamanya❤️ 54 tau
tvri_cle...	sifat sirik kuat sekali , pak	pr...	jadi presen thn 2024 68
tvri_cle...	agama2 slain islam . 69 [] pak	pr...	seorang gentle , tulus , nasionalis , cinta
tvri_cle...	mau menterima saran . salut pak	pr...	14 juli suara milikmu . 70
tvri_cle...	pak .. 74 presen indonesia pak	pr...	.. hati2 pak dnng penghianat 75
tvri_cle...	Latn] slm hadir❤️2❤️bapak	pr...	~~~~~ 80 salam hadir 81 [] giliran
tvri_cle...	untuk menyerang paslon alain sedangkan	pr...	dan ganjar berani mengutarakan apa
tvri_cle...	lah kecewa nya saya ama	pr...	, pdahal anies sering ngomong dg
tvri_cle...	nya , beda ama junjungan kita	pr...	, terlihat bertele tele sekali , kaya
tvri_cle...	kosong 🙌🙌 109 [gl] all out	pr...	gibrar 🙌❤️ 110 all out prabowo
tvri_cle...	prabowo gibrar 🙌❤️ 110 all out	pr...	❤️❤️ 111 [] sabar itu dlam mnghdpi
tvri_cle...	itu dlam mnghdpi cobaan , klu	pr...	trlihat tdak ada kesiapaan dalam
tvri_cle...	krna anak nya tau , lau	pr...	itu gak bisa ngontrol emosi
tvri_cle...	nya is the best 🙌🙌 119 []	pr...	bukan nya hebat , tapi emang
tvri_cle...	gak bermutu saat deba 🙌🙌 122 []	pr...	gibran adalah pasangan komplit gak
tvri_cle...	123 [ms]@kasihanitina75 di sering	pr...	sbg menhan bodoh , bkan prabowo
tvri_cle...	prabowo sbg menhan bodoh , bkan	pr...	sbg kpl rmh tngga 🙌🙌 124
tvri_cle...	gusdur bodoh 🙌🙌 125 di sering	pr...	, sbg menhan , bukan prabowo seoring
tvri_cle...	sering prabowo , sbg menhan , bukan	pr...	seoring ayah , bedakan cil stateman
tvri_cle...	jwb nya apa 132 pak	pr...	panjenengan orang berbudi luhur ya

Figure 5. TVRI's KWIC Results

Document	Left	Term	Right
kpu_cle...	presen ri sebelumnya , kalau memang	pak	prabowo terlibat penculikan , sampai saat
kpu_cle...	yeaa.4jj1 . 24 tersakito akhirnya	pak	prabowo jadi presen ■■ 25 [jv]
kpu_cle...	cerda ♥ 28 [jv] kompak serang	pak	prabowo , nyatanyaa pak prabowo menang
kpu_cle...	kompak serang pak prabowo , nyatanyaa	pak	prabowo menang 58%♥♥ 30 [] indonesia
kpu_cle...	amanah serta tanggungjawab 🙏 72 mantap	pak	prabowo 🙏🙏 🌟🌟 73 [nl] zzzz* * 74
kpu_cle...	banyak cobaan banyak utang selama	pak	jokowi menjadi presen selama ni
kpu_cle...	84 menhan di kuliahi sama	pak	anies 85 alhamdulillah .. 🙏🙏 🙏 86 alhamdulillah
kpu_cle...	no 28 tahun 199 . 104	pak	any mewakili seluruh unek - unek
kpu_cle...	unek - unek para rakyaaatt👉good	pak	anies👉🙏 105 strimer viral 106
kpu_cle...	salam agama lain lupa ya	pak	110 cantiknya baju biry 112
kpu_cle...	jd lu jelasin rekam jejak	pak	bowo apa di lakukan 5
kpu_cle...	115 [] jadi anda tak suka	pak	bowo karena pak bowo 5
kpu_cle...	tak suka pak bowo karena	pak	bowo 5 tahun tak bisa
kpu_cle...	116 [hi-Latn] tetap semangat	pak	parabowo 🙏 (R) 117 [] jangan sampe
kpu_cle...	cuma pisah dengan istri .karna	pak	suharto menkira pak bowo melengserkan
kpu_cle...	istri .karna pak suharto menkira	pak	bowo melengserkan beliau saat menjadi
kpu_cle...	menjadipresen) . nah itu sedang diperjuangkan	pak	wowo saat ini.ha untuk cinta
kpu_cle...	orang begitu saja 127 [] jelas	pak	prabowo program hebat . untuk membuat
kpu_cle...	saya like konten ini karena	pak	anies 146 [] nggak benar aturan
kpu_cle...	179 [jv] aku mendukung mu	pak	prabowo♥♥ 180 lo ngapa wibu
kpu_cle...	umur dan bukan timses nya	pak	prabowo , maka lu liat dulu
kpu_cle...	aja banyak ketar ketir kalau	pak	prabowo naik jd presen , lu
kpu_cle...	tau ga karna apa ? karna	pak	prabowo memiliki prinsip kenegarawanan yang
kpu_cle...	noh kalau mau tau kerja	pak	prabowo apa , liat gmna dia
kpu_cle...	prabowo kita saja gk tau	pak	pabowo terbukti atau tdk ikut
kpu_cle...	10 ribu .. ngerto ? 198 [] jangan	pak	, nanti tugas kulaih saya juga
kpu_cle...	jadi presen 201 [ht] mantebb	pak	wowill nantang pak anis . 202
kpu_cle...	ht] mantebb pak wowill nantang	pak	anis . 202 [ht] tetap prabowo
kpu_cle...	saya pelajari sejak sd . 208 []	pak	prabowo jangan pake fasilitas umum
kpu_cle...	di jakarta yaa soal bilang	pak	anies omon2 ajaa 209 [] awal

Figure 6. KPU's KWIC Results

B. Discussion

Religion, Party, and Candidate

Voyant's proximity maps for the TVRI and KPU threads converge on the same structural fact like personalization, not religious or partisan fusion, organizes the comment space. The most saturated tie is the honorific-leader edge (*pak* ↔ *prabowo*), with secondary candidate/ticket bridges (e.g., *prabowo* ↔ *gibran* on KPU) and event anchoring (*debat* on TVRI). Religious tokens do not penetrate the high-weight neighbourhoods, and canonical religion, party, and candidate triads fail to form. In short, alignment is leader-centric and role/ticket-forward, not creed- or party-fused.

This pattern is methodologically coherent with corpus-based discourse work showing that collocation networks recover the organizing lexical relations of a discourse community, where identity categories are salient and co-referenced, they surface as robust co-occurrence constellations, but where talk is personalized, hub nodes become proper names and address forms (e.g., *pak*) rather than doctrinal labels. In other words, the absence of religion-candidate edges are substantive signal, not a measurement artefact. Prior corpus-linguistics research similarly treats collocation (and correlation) as a reliable diagnostic of ideological alignment in political texts, precisely because it captures stable local associations rather than anecdotal mentions (Brookes and McEneaney, 2020).

Read through SIT, the maps indicate identity performance without cross-domain fusion. Commenters certainly index in-groups (deference to a leader, and ticket recognition), yet they do not lexicalize those in-groups as religious blocs. This echoes recent accounts of *personalization of politics* in Indonesia's networked campaigning, where elite labels and leader personas eclipse institutional or doctrinal references in public-facing talk. The collocation geometry here, honorific hubs, candidate bridges, event scaffolds, matches that macro-trend and suggests that, at least around Round Three, *ticket* and *person* carried the identity load more than *party* and *religion* (Guevara and Theviot, 2024).

Two theoretical payoffs follow. First, the weak religion-candidate coupling lowers the probability that debate-adjacent talk was sorting into confessional camps in real time, where religion animated 2014/2019 cycles on other platforms. Previous Indonesian studies of the 2019 campaign show that explicit religious signalling tends to co-occur with confrontational or "hate spin" strategies. Its absence from the collocation core here suggests a different register around the official streams, one that privileges respect and electoral roles over sectarian boundary-marking (Prayogi and Fahadayna, 2024).

Second, the strength of honorific address (*pak*) is not trivial politeness noise, it is an index of deferential person-focus that re-routes identity work from institutions to personas. That pathway is consistent with platform research demonstrating that moral-affective and status cues receive reinforcement online; when attention and social feedback reward leader-centered talk, lexical fields densify around names and honorifics rather than around institutional categories (e.g., parties, religious authorities). While our RQ1 analysis is non-causal, the observed hubs are compatible with evidence that social

feedback loops amplify affectively charged or identity-relevant tokens, shaping future expression (Brady et al., 2021).

Civics-morality ration

Based on SIT, both arenas mobilize identity talk, but only the KPU thread consistently grounds that identity in procedural and institutional language. In other words, moralized persona narration (moral appraisal of leaders) dominates TVRI, while procedural narration (such as rules, roles, and offices) organizes KPU. This divergence corroborates two adjacent literatures. First, research on moralized language online shows that platforms preferentially reward moral-emotional expression, amplifying it through social feedback loops, such incentives depress procedural register in open comment threads and help explain TVRI's low ratio (higher share of moral tokens relative to civics) (Brady et al., 2021; Brady et al., 2019). Second, the measurement tradition in deliberation (e.g., DQI and subsequent text-based indicators) treats references to rules, evidence, and institutions as valid lexical signals of higher deliberative quality. KPU's vocabulary profile thus maps onto recognized indicators of "reason-giving" discourse, whereas TVRI's profile maps onto expressive or evaluative talk (Bächtiger et al., 2022; Goddard and Gillespie, 2023).

Civics vs. religious: Exhibit procedural reasoning or confrontational rhetoric

These micro-context patterns are theoretically expected. In SIT terms, both threads enact in-group belonging, yet they perform that belonging differently, status/affect signals dominate TVRI's identity talk, while institutional and evidentiary signals scaffold KPU's. The divergence aligns with platform research showing that moralized language attracts engagement and antagonistic replies, nudging threads toward confrontational registers. The TVRI profile here, whereas reason-giving and institutional references index higher deliberative quality, the KPU profile (Solovev and Pröllochs, 2022; Goddard and Gillespie, 2023).

4. Conclusion

Substantive

1. Decentering "religion as default identity glue." In a 2024 single-event corpus, religious tokens did not structure alignment, even amid Indonesia's well-documented religious brokerage (e.g., NU) during the cycle. Commenters organized identity via leader/ticket cues instead. This nuance complements work on Indonesia that documents religious mobilization offline/elite-level, by showing that comment-level coupling can remain leader-centric in debate talk (Wadipalapa and Budiatri, 2025).
2. Venue-conditioned deliberation. The civics-morality split by channel suggests institutional affordances matter: the election commission's thread elicits rule- and process-forward narration, the broadcaster's thread invites persona-moral

performance. This dovetails with comparative findings that platform/editorial context shapes interactivity, rationality, and civility (Boukes, 2024).

Methodological

1. Triangulated, fast audit on a single-event corpus. The paper assembles three lightweight, reviewer-auditable diagnostics: (i) collocation triads for identity alignment. (ii) topic-conditioned civics/morality ratios for deliberative emphasis. (iii) KWIC rule-labels for frame style, implemented transparently in Voyant Tools and aligned with best practices in corpus-based political discourse analysis (Brookes and McEnery, 2020).
2. Normative sensitivity without heavy modeling. By conditioning dictionaries by topic and verifying with KWIC, the approach avoids common pitfalls of generic sentiment, echoing current recommendations from computational social science and measurement reviews (Macanovic, 2022).

Empirical

1. Event-specific evidence from Indonesia's 2024 debate that personalization dominated lexical architectures of identity in comments, religion was peripheral, and procedural reasoning clustered on KPU. This contributes granular, language-level backing to broader accounts of the 2024 campaign's elite cues, social media centrality, and democratic anxieties (Steele, 2024).
2. Externally relevant mechanism. The link between moralized vocabulary and confrontational replies observed in international studies maps onto the TVRI thread, offering a portable mechanism for why some debate venues drift toward antagonism while others sustain rule-referencing talk (Solovev and Pröllochs, 2022).

Limitation and future research

The analysis focuses on two official uploads of one debate round and comment text only (no multimodal features and no reply-tree dynamics). Future work can: (a) expand channels (media/party-affiliated), (b) model reply cascades to detect persuasion versus pile-ons, and (c) triangulate with panel survey exposure to test whether procedural lexicon predicts downstream institutional trust.

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